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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LIABILITY CRISIS OR
PATIENT COMPENSATION CRISIS?
Kathryn Zeiler·

INTROD ucnON

Tort reform has been a hot topic among those interested in assessing whether and how well the tort system aids injured plaintiffs' ability
to achieve civil justice. The debate has been especially heated when it
comes to medical malpractice liability. Proponents of malpractice liability reforms-reforms such as damages caps and shifts from joint
and several liability to proportionate liability-argue that the broken

and out-of-control liability system is error-prone and produces too
many jumbo verdicts.! According to this argument, the huge and
highly variable awards cause medical malpractice insurers to increase
premiums, which leads to an increase in the cost of healthcare, an in crease in the number of uninsured, and a decrease in the number of
physicians who are willing to practice in jurisdictions that are sometimes labeled as "judicial hellholes."2
Tort reform opponents, on the other hand, tend to argue that limitations on recovery or access to the tort system violate constitutional
rights and that some reforms do more harm than good. For example,
they claim that damages caps make it difficult for a subset of negligently injured plaintiffs to find a lawyer who is willing to pursue a
legal claim on a contingency fee basis. Opponents also argue that the
liability system is not the cause of insurance premium spikes;3 thus,
reforms should not be expected to stabilize premiums, at least in the
• Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; zeiler@law.georgetown.edu:
www.georgetown.edulfacultyfkmz3l. Special thanks to Leslie Street, Georgetown University
Law Center Reference Librarian and resear,h wmpanion: Juli ette Forstenzer. LLM 2009, Ge·
orgetown University Law Ce nter: Kristen Gorzclan y, J.D. Ca nd idate 2012, George town Univer·
sity Law Center; and David Thornton, J.D. Ca nd idate 2011 , Georgetown University Law Cenler.
I. See discussion infra Pari II.
2. See infra nOles 21 - 27, 45, 72-73, 82 and accompa nying text; William Lamb. Pro· Lawsuit
Crol'p Wan lS President's Ear. ST. LoUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 5, 2005 (,ha ra'ierizing Madiso n
and 51. Clair cOl.lnlies, in lllinnis, as Uj l.ldkial hellholes").
3. See discussion infra Part II .
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long run.4 Some opponents further argue that the unreformed tort
system does not do enough to compe nsate neglige ntly injured
patients.!i
Until recently, rhetoric about the liability syste m and its relationship to both insurance markets and provider supply dominated tort
reform debates. While claims made by both proponents and opponents may seem intuitive, they are often unsubstantiated. ID recent
years, however, academics and others have acquired or created
datasets to perform analyses with the purpose of enhancing our understanding of the relationship between the tort system and medical
malpractice insurance markets. These studies have helped to shift tort
reform debates away from rhetoric and toward inferences drawn from
facts that are reported in empirical studies.
While empirical research has been useful in shifting po licy debates
from rhetoric to reality, not all aspects of the tort reform debate have
been empirically addressable. Most notably, although the vast majority of medical malpractice cases are resolved through private se nlements between medical malpractice insurers, providers, and patients,
resea rchers have bee n historically unable to observe settlement outcomes.6 This limitation has, in turn, limited our ability to observe
both the impact of the liability stystem on import ant outcomes and the
impact on the liability system of changes to the legal rules. R ecently
discovered datasets collected by state insurance departments, however, have provided a window into settlement outcomes, allowing us
to examine important connections between liability systems and insurance markets.1 . Using these datasets we have been able to track, for
the first time in some cases, comprehensive trends in the numbe r of
claims and the size of payouts over time ; potential impacts of tort re4. We mi ght expect short·term decreases in premiums if insu rers expec t reduced losses. If
refo nn s do not in fact reduce losses, however, insurers are forced to increase prices to compen·
sate for short-tenn underpricing.
5. See David M. Studdert, Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Medical Malpracrice, 350
NEW ENG. J. MEO. 283, 285 (2004) ("On ly 2 percent of negligent injuries resu lted in claims
. ... "); accord Patricia Born, W. Kip Viscusi & Tom Baker, The ejfects of TOrI Reform 011
Medical Malpractice l!lSurers' Ultimate LosSl!s, 16 J. RISK & INS. 191, 198 (2009).
6. See VASANl'HA KUMAR N. BHAT, MEDICAl... MAI...PRACTICE 32 (2OCH); Patricia Mu nch
Danzon & Lee A. Lillard, Sell/emen' oul of Coun: The Disposilion of Medical Malprac/ice
Claims, 12 J. LEGAl... STlJo. 345, 341 ( 1983); S tephen 1. Spurr & Walter O. Simmo ns, Medical
Malpractice in Michigan: An Economic Analysis, 2 1 J . H EA I...TtI POI.- POI...'y & LAW 315, 323 n.16
(1996).
1. See, e.g., Bernard Black et aI., Stability, NOI Crisis: Medical Malpraclice Claim Oil/comes in
Texas, 1988-2()()2,2 J. EMPIR ICA L LEGAl... Sruo. Z01, 209 (2005) (desc ribin g Texas's closed claims
medical malpractice dat aset); Neil Vidmar et a I., Unrovering Ihe " Invisible'· Profile of Medical
Malpractice tili8ation: i!lSi8hlS from Florida. 54 DEPAU l... L. REV. 315, 318 (ZOOS) (describing
Florida's d osed medical malpractice dataset).
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form on recoveri es; connections between policy limits and payouts;
trends in purchases of coverage over time; and trends in defense
costS.8

The Texas Department of Insurance (TDI) was one of the first slate
insurance departments to collect and make publicly available c1aimslevel data on closed medical malpractice c1aims.9 TDl began collecting and reporting data on closed claims in the late 1980s, followin g a
sharp rise in medical malpractice insurance premiums. 1o When a
Texas insurer closes a medical malpractice claim, it is required to report certain information about payments, patient characteristics, litigation outcomes, timing of litigation procedures and outcomes,
location where the injury occurred, jurisdiction of the lawsuit , and
characteristics of other defendants and payments made by each.tt
During the pe riod from 1988 to 2005, Texas insurers fil ed roughly
16,000 reports related to closed medical malpractice c1aimsP
8. See Black et aI., supra note 7; David A. Hyman et al., Do Defendanls Pay Whal Juries
Award? Posl-Verdicl Haireuls in Texas Medical Malp ractice Cases, 1988-2003,4 J. EMP IKICA L
LECA L STUD. 3,5 (2007 ) [hereina fler H yma n et aI., Defendcwts Payl ; David A. Hyman CI aI.,
£Srimming the Effect of Damages Caps in Medical Malpraclice Cases: Evidence from Texas, 1 J .
LEGA L ANALYSIS 355, 355 (2009) (he re inafter H yman et aI., Evidence from Texas ]; Kathryn
Zeile r et al., Physicians' illsurance Limits an d Ma lpractice Payments: Evidence from Texas
Closed Claims, 199fJ-2(}()3, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 59, 59 (2007).
9. See T EX. D EP'Y OF INS .. 1997 TEXAS LI AOILITY INSURANCE CLOSED CLA IM ANNUAL RE.
PORT (1997), available UI http://www.tdi.state.tx.uslreportslreport4.html (last visi ted July 13,
2(09).
10. See Black et al .. supra note 7, at 208, 215 (describing the da ta co llected by the Texas
Depa rtmen t of Insurance (TOI ». The description of the data in th e text is auributed to Black et
al. unl ess otherwise ind ica ted. A "claim" in this context is a request by an insured provider for
indemnification for an incurred or expected loss from an insured pe ril. See TEX. DEPT OF INS.,
T EXAS CLOSED CLAIM R EPORTING GUIDE (2004) [hereinafter REPORTING GUIDE ] (on fi le with
au th o r). Claims filed by the insured are not always accompanied by the fi lin g of a lawsuit. A
claim is considered closed when the insurer has made all indemn it y and expense payments o n
Ih e claim. See id. TOI has audi ted the data for complete ne ss and accura cy (but for o nly some
va riables) since 1990. Black el al. exclude 1988-1989 when re porting number of claims due 10
poten tial incompleteness. See Black et aI., supra nOle 7, at 215.
11. See R EPORTING GUtDE, supra note 10. TDI does some wor k to audit reports. See Black
et al., supra nOle 7, at 215.
12. Set! Hyman et aI., EvidenCt! from Texas, supra note 8, a t 364. The data TDI collects vary
accord ing to th e size of th e total kn own payment to th e claimant by all defendants. For clai ms
with payments less than $24,999. insurers are no t required to repor t the cause of the injury;
th erefo re, sepa ral ing med ical malpraclice claims from ot he r types of clairru; is impossible. For
this reason, most resu lts are prod uced using only "large" claims-those with total payments of at
least $25,000. In addition, TDI does not adjust the reportin g thres hold from year 10 year. Therefore, th e number of claims report ed as large claims will increase over time due in pa rt to innation. To co ntrol for this, we exclude claims with payouts measured in 1988 dollars tha t fa ll
betwee n S25,OOO (nominal ) and 525,000 (1988 dollars). For exampl e, we excluded all claims
closed in 1989 with payouts betwee n $25,000 and $26,205 (buying powe r of $25,000 in 1988
dollars).
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Datasets like the one TDI generates and distributes allow us to better assess the liability system's ability to deliver just outcomes. They
also allow us to verify or challenge claims made by proponents and
opponents of tort reform, assess the impacts of tort reform on important outcomes, and better understand the relationship between the liability system and insurance markets. Instead of supporting claims
made by those who blame medical malpractice liability system crises
for rising insurance premiums, results using closed claims data, when
taken as a whole, suggest that we might instead be facing a patient
compensation crisis.
This Article is organized as follows. Part II summarizes the common rhetoric in tort reform debates that places the blame for rising
premiums on the liability system and touts tort reform as the cure-all
for ailing insurance markets.1 3 It then summarizes empirical results,
produced using Texas closed claims data and other data, which suggest
not only that Texas tort reform advocates wrongly placed blame on
the liability system, but also that noneconomic damages caps passed in
2003 have caused more harm than good. 14 Part III describes results
that suggest that the widely used tactic of pointing to jumbo jury verdicts to justify tort reform is misguided. IS While verdicts and payouts
are positively correlated, patients and their lawyers, on average, recover only fifty-six cents of each dollar awarded. 16 In addition, the
larger the verdict, the lower the fraction paid. 17 While judicial oversight and damages caps explain about a third of the difference between verdicts and payouts, the largest chunk of the difference is
explained by the fact that patients rarely recover more than the provider's insurance policy limits. This finding is cause for concern, especially given the fact that coverage purchased by Texas physicians is
lower than conventional wisdom would predict and is continually on
the decline. 18 The data paint a picture not of a liability system in crisis, but of a patient compensation crisis, one that might severely limit
the ability of the liability system to deliver civil justice to negligently
injured patients.

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

See
See
See
See
Id.
See

infra nOles 19--44 and accompanying le~l.
infra nOles 46-71 and accompanying le~l.
infra nOles 72-127 and accompanying lexl.
Hyman el ai., Defendants Pay , supra nOle 8,

01

4.

discussion infra Pari 1I1.C.
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THE TORT REFORM DEBATE

In 1999, Texas medical malpractice insurers started to sharply in~
crease insurance premiums. 19 Some insurers continued to increase
rates through 2003.20 Proponents of tort reform argued that an outof-control liability system was causing the sudden and sharp premium
increase.21 Specifically, they maintained that medical malpractice insurers had no choice but to increase premiums both because the number of claims and the size of payments were on the rise, and because
juries were increasingly handing down outrageously large damages
awards. 22 They also claimed that the broken liability system regularly
and handsomely rewarded sympathetic plaintiffs who brought frivolous claims.23
In 2003, the Texas legislature passed a tort reform package that included caps on noneconomic damages in an effort to address the perceived insurance and tort system crisis.24 During the run-up to
passage, supporters claimed that "[c]apping noneconomic damages at
reasonable limits would encourage insurers to do business in Texas by
ensuring that they would not incur massive losses because of large
damage awards."2s Some went further to claim that public resources
were at stake: Texas Senator Robert Deuell argued during floor debate that " (w]hen noneconomic damages are excessive, it 's really not
the defendant ... that pays. It's the other people who pay into the
insurance plans."16 Deuell went on to assert that taxpayers ultimately
pay for excessive awardsP
19. Su Black et aI., supra nOle 7. at 224 fig.L
20. Id.
21. Eric Torbenson & Jason Roberson, TOfl Reform: Is This Change Healfhy? DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Jun e 17, 2007, at lA, 14A; Texans for Lawsuit Reform, Texas Urgently Needs
Tort Reform to Avert Furthe r Damage to Healthca re System, http://www.lonreform.com/nodel
173 (last visited July 13, 2009).
22. Su Torbcnson & Roberson, supra note 21, at 14A.
23. See Texans for Lawsuit Reform, supra note 21; Mike Thomas, Op-Ed.. Medical Malprac·
lice Needs an Overhaul, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 6, 2009, at BI.
24. HOUSE RESEARCH ORO., Focus RE PORT OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS PII.OPOSED
FOR SEPT. 2003 BALLOT, H.R. No. 78·10, at 33. (2003), available at http://www.capito l.state. tx.usl
focuslamend78.pdf. 10 addition to caps on noneconomic damages, the ton reform package in·
eluded other provisions meant to reduce expected liability such as modifications to joint and
several liability rules and the possibility of periodic payments. See Ronen Avraham, Dalabase of
Slate La ... TorI Reforms (DSTLR, 2nd) 116--18 (Nw. Uoiv. Sch. of Law, Law & Ecoo. Research
Paper No. ()6-{)8, 2(06), available at hup:lfssm.comlabsuact=902711.
25. HOUSE RESEAII.CH 011.0., Focus REPOII.T OF CONSTlTl.ITIONAL AMENDMENTS PII.OPOSED
FOR SEPT. 2003 BALLOT, H.R. No. 78·10, at 33 (2003), available at hUp:llwww.capitol.slate.lx.usl
focuslamcod78.pdf.
26. 'd.
27. Black et al., supra note 7, at Dl fig.4.
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Whjle rhetoric often takes center stage in tort reform debates, recent compilation and dissemination of comprehensive datasets on
closed medical malpractice insurance claims has allowed us to observe
actual trends in medical malpractice litigation and to get a better handle on the relationship between the liability system and insurance
markets. Empirical analyses of Texas's closed claims data have helped
to evaluate whether trends in the liability system actually justified the
noneconomic damages cap passed in Texas and whether and to what
extent the cap might impact litigation outcomes. The studies suggest
that much of the rhetoric missed the mark.
A.

Did Conditions Warrant Caps and Other Reforms?

The Texas closed claims data have been used to test multiple claims
of tort reform proponents. With respect to the number of claims, the
data do not support rhetorical claims that the number of medical malpractice claims steeply increased prior to the passage of the statutory
nonecOllOmic damages cap. Instead , the data demonstrate that the
per capita claims rate was stable from 1990 to 2002.28 Whether growth
rates are measured using total number of claims per year, number of
large paid claims, or percentage of claims that resulted in large
payouts, the conclusion is the same: the number of large paid claims
did not increase over time.29 In fact , when we control for changes in
the number of practicing physicians or growth in inflation-adjusted
healthcare spending, we find that the number of large paid claims decreased.30 Both the number of claims with payments of less than
$10,000 and with payments between $10,000 and $25,000 appear stable
over time.J1
How about claims related to payment size prior to the passage of
the 2003 damages cap? More specifically, do the data support claims
that payment size was skyrocketing during the late 1990s and early
2000s? Again, the empirical results suggest that these assertions were
greatly exaggerated. Despite the variability and possible increase in
the average damages awards from 1988 to 2002,32 payouts per claim
28. rd.
29. Id. Adjusting for population growt h, the number of physicians, and heallhcare spe nding
all ows us to control for changes in claims ral es due to changes in th e number of Texas residents.
'd. It is important 10 co ntrol fo r changes in these va ri ables because if, for example, we find that
claims rates increa sed due to a populalion increase, we would nOI character ize th e claims rate
increase as a crisis. 11 is somelhing that we would expect.
30. 'd. at 231 figA, 233 Ibl.1.
31. 'd. at 234 figS
32. 'd. at 249-5 1.
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were either relatively stable or slightly increased. 33 After controlling
for the increase in healthcare costs, which is a significant component
of amounts paid to injured patie nts, average payouts were either stable or declined over time.:>4 Defense costs per large paid cl aim increased over the period but did so gradually.3!i In addition, defense
costs comprise only a small fraction of payout dollars. 36 As a percentage of Texas gross state product, the total cost for aU large paid claims
(including infl ation-adjusted indemnified amounts and defense costs)
was roughly flat over 1990-2002.37 Thus, the gradual increase in total
costs during the late 1990s is likely explained by a predictable increase
in medical costs, not an out-of-control liability system. 38
These results, taken together, suggest that the data do not support
those who use claims about the sta te of the medical malpractice li abil ity system in Texas in order to justify tort reform . Contrary to the
assertions of tort reform proponents, closed claims data suggest little
connection between the liability system and premium fluctu ations. 39
If a broken liability system was not behind the sharp increase in
insurance premiums during the late 19905 and early 2000s, it raises the
question , what was? One possibility is that increases were the unintended consequence of price regulations. Specifically, when Texas
passed its 1995 tort refonn package, it also imposed a mandatory insurance pre mium reduction based on expected losses to ensure that
the predicted savings of insurers would be passed on to healthcare
providers.4o Prices declined for three years, reflecting the belief of th e
insurers and regulators that tort reform would reduce losses. Sharp
33. Id. at 238 fig.9. Note that while median payouts remained stable from 1996 to 2000. th e
mean payout increased fro m roughl y $280,000 10 $360.000 (a twenty·nine percent increase). In·
surance premium increases, however, far o ut paced this increase. See id. at 224 fig. I.
34. 'd. al 237-4 1.
35. rd. al 243 fig. I I.
36. Id. at 245. Data on 2;ero payout and small payout claims are unavailab le; therefore. 11 is
impossible to estimate the change in total defense costs over time. Black et at. however. cast
doubt on the possibility that defense costs caused the sharp premium increases. Id.
37. Id. at 248 fig. 13.
38. Id. at 248.
39. Black et al. note that because data on open claims is unavailable premium increases might
in f,ct be due to an increase in the number of claims or an increase in expectcd payouts on open
claims. See id. a t 210. While th e dala employed in their study cannot rule out this possibility, th e
authors argue that it is unlike ly. See jd. at 210, 2 18-19. In any event, this hypoth esis will be
testable as open claims close and reports are filed with TO!. In addition. TOI does no t collect
data on physician specialty. Therefore, th e da1a cannol be used to stud y connections between
the liability system and insurance markets for subsets of physician$ that are particu larly hard hit
by insurance premium increases (e.g., obstetricians). Despite this limitation, the data are useful
for debunking more general rhetocical claims.
40. See Tru(. INS. CODE. ANN. § 5.131 (Vernon 2006) (repealed Apr. 1, 2007).

HeinOnline -- 59 DePaul L. Rev. 681 2009-2010

682

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:675

price increases, however, began in 1998. 41 This observation is consistent with the theory that tort reform did not reduce losses as much as
ex pected and that insurers were forced to substantially increase rates
(and regulators were forced to honor these rate increase requests) in
order to replenish their reserves that were hit hard by the below-cost
pricing following tort reform. 42 Black et al. posit additional alternative explanations, including contemporaneous shocks to reinsurance
markets and the long-tail nature of medical malpractice claims. 43 Ultimately, furth er study is req uired to uncover the cause of price increases in Texas.
While data Jimitations~such as unobservable defense costs and the
lack of information on the impact of the Liability system across medical specialties 44 - might hinder our ability to draw definitive conclusions regarding whether the liability system is responsible for the
sharp increase in premiums, empirical studies are helpful in shifting
the debate away from rhetoric and toward reality. Analyses of this
kind can help shift the burden of proof to tort reform proponents by
compelling them to substantiate their claims with evidence. As the
next Section demonstrates, empirical studies can also help determine
whether tort reforms are successful.
8.

Have Reforms Met Their Intended Goals?

In debates over whether to reform the liability system in order to
ste"1 the rise of medical malpractice insurance premiums, rhetoric
about the potential impacts of tort reform is as co mmon as rhetoric
about the out-of-control liability system . Proponents of tort reform
often point to evidence produced by industry players with an interest
in the outcome of the debate, suggesting that implementation of d amages caps, limitations on joint and several liability, reform of collateral
sou rce rules, tightening of statutes of limitations, and other reforms
have a substantial impact on medical malpractice insurance
premiums.45
Recent studies, however, have demonstrated fairly convincingly
that tort reforms do not substa ntially reduce insurance premiums.
41. Su Black et al., 511pra note 7, at 254.
42. Su id. I am current ly constructing a multiSlate dataset to investiga te thi s conjecture.
43. Id. at 253-54.
44. Texas does not require reporting of defense C()Sts when small payouts are made. Su supra
nOle 12. It also does not require insurers to report the provider's specialt y. See 5upra note 9.
45. Su e.g., Am. Tort Reform Ass'n, Facts About Tort Liabilit y and lIS Impact on Cons umers,
hllp:l/www.atra.orglwrnpJfiles.cgi/7%3_howtortreform. html (last visi ted Dcc. 14,20(9) (providing information about the costs of the U.S. tort system; figures are from a 2004 report by Tillinghast, an insurance industry consultancy).
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Empiricists have investigated the impacts of various tort reforms on
claims rates, average payouts, and insurance premiums. The results,
some of which are summarized below, suggest that reforms have little
to no impact on these variables, although the most restrictive damages
caps seem to have some impact. 46
While some evidence suggests that joint and several liability limitations are associated with lower premiums,47 other results suggest that
these limitations do not decrease payouts. 48 Although, to my knowledge, we do not have evidence about this reform's impact on the
claims rate , the evidence related to premiums and payouts in Texas is
consistent with the conjecture that, in the absence of an effect of joint
and several liability reform on average payouts, mandatory price decreases, passed in conjunction with tort reforms, caused the observed
price decreases.
Findings related to the impacts of statutes of limitations and repose
reforms are also mixed. Some studies suggest that these reforms reduce average payouts;49 some suggest they do not. so Other studies
suggest tbat tbese reforms reduce claim frequency;sl some find they
do not. S2 Similarly, some studies conclude that these reforms reduce
46. All studies cite d in this section use sophisticated methods to estimate effects and control
for alternative explanations.

47. Set! Glenn Blackmon & Richard Zeckhauser, Stale TOri Reform Legislalion: AsstS5ing Our
Control of Risks, in TORT LAW AND THE PuBLIC INTER EST: COMPETITION, INNOVATION, ANO
CONSUMER WEU'ARE 272, 274-75 (Peter H. Schuck e d., 1991 ); Patricia M. Dam:on, Andre w J.
Epstein & Sooll J , Johnson , The Crisis in Medical Malpractice lnSllrance, in BROOKINGS-WHAR.
TON PAPE RS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 55, 82 ( R. Harris & R. Litan eds. 2004); W. Kip Viscusi et
al. , The Effect of 198& TOri Reform Legislation on General Liabiliry and Medical Malpractice
lnsurance, 6 1. RISK & UNCERTA lf"l~ 165, 165 (1993). BUI see Kenneth E. Thorpe, The Medical
Malpractice "Crisis»: Recent Trends Qrld the Impact of State Tort Reforms, HEALTH AFF. W4-2D,
W4·25 to W4·26 (Supp. Web Exclusives Jan. 21, 2(04), available at hUp:lloontenl.heallh
affairs.org!cgilcontenllfull/hlthaff. w4.2OvIlDC1.
48. See Ronen Avraham, An Empirical Study of the lmpact of TOri Reforms on Medical Mal·
practice Selllement Payments, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. SI83, S206 (2007): Blackmon & Zeckhauser.
supra note 47, at 277; Viscusi e t al., supra not e 47, at 181-82; Teresa M. Wate rs et al.. Market
Walch: Impact of Siale Tort Reforms on PhysiciQrl Malpractice Paymenrs, 26 H EALTH AFF. 500,
508 (2007).
49. See Patricia Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Malpractice Claims, 27 J.L. & ECON.
11 5, 139 (1984).
SO. See Frank A. Sloan, Paula M. Mergenhagen & Randall R. Bovbjerg, Efft!Crs of Tori Reforms on the Value afClosed Medical Malpractice Claims: A Microanalysi5, 14 1. HEALTH POL.
POI..' y & L. 663, 674 (1989); Stephen Zuckennan, Randall R. Bovbjerg & Frank A. Sloan, Effects
of TOri Reforms and Other FaclOr:; on Medical Malpractice Insurance Premiums, 27 INQU IRY 167.
180 (1990); Blackmon & Zeckhauser, supra note 47, at 278; Waters e t al. , supra nOle 48, at 507.
51. See Patricia M. Danwn, The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims: New
Evidence, 49 LAW & CoNTEMi'. PRODS. 57, 71 (1986); Zucke nnan et aI., supra note 47, at 167.
52. See Danwn, supra note 49, at 116.
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premiums,s3 but others find no association between the reforms and
premiums.54 Further in vestigation of the impacts of statutes of limita·
tions and repose reform is required in order to more confidently assess how these reforms affect o utcomes.
The literature, however, does signal consensus on the impacts of a
number of reform s, including attorney contingency fee limits, collateral source offsets, pre tri al screening panels, and periodic payments. 55
The majority of published studies find that these reforms do not decrease claim frequency, payment severity, or premiums. The gene ral
rhetoric prevalent in tort reform debates might account (or the continued popularity of these reforms despite the strong evidence that they
do not achieve their intended goals.
The evidence o n the effectiveness of damages caps-the most po pular tort reform- is mixed.56 Some analysts find that caps o n
non economic damages do not significantly lower premiums. 57 Others
find that states have enjoyed premium reductions when they cap both
economic and no necon omic damages or when they implement relatively restrictive caps.58 Likewise, some analysts find that caps lead to
small decreases in defensive medicine,59 but o the rs find no effect. 60 In
particular, Morrisey et al. find no impact of caps on health insurance
premiums for employer-sponsored insurance,61 while Avraham and
Schazenbach find (1) a positive associati on between caps on total
damages and rates of pri vate healthcare coverage for price-sensitive
53. See Zuckerma n et at , supro note 50, a t 167.
54. See Blackmo n & Zeckh auser, supro note 47, at 287; Fra nk A. Sloan, StIlte Responses to the
Malpractice Insurance "Crisis" of the 1970s: An Empirical Assessment, 9 J. HEA \..TH Po\... PO\..'y
& L. 629, 629 (1985).
55. See Michelle Mello, Medical Malpraclice: Impact of the Crisis and Effect of StIlte Tort Reforms 10 (Robe rt Wood Joh nson Foundation Resea rch Sy nthesis Reporl , 2006), available at
ht lp:Jlwww.policysyn thesis.org.
56. See id. at 9-11.
57. See BHAT. supra note 6, al 109; Z uckerman et aI. , Sllpra note 50, at 180.
58. See BHAT, supra nOle 6, at 101-03; Danzan et aI., supra note 47, al 89; Meredit h L. Kil gore, Mic hae l A. Morrisey & Leonard J. Nelso n, TOri Law and Medical Ma/practiu Insurance
Premiums, 43 INQU IRY 255, 255 (2006); Thorpe, supra note 47, at W4-20; Z ucke rm an et aI., supra
nOle SO, at 180.
59. See Daniel P. Kessler & Mark B. McClellan, How Liability Law A ffects Medical Productivity, 21 J. HEAI..TH ECON. 931,932 (2002).
60. See CONCRESSIONAI.. BUOGET OFFICE, LI MITINC TORT LIAB II..ITY FO R MEO ICA I.. MA .....
PRACTICE (2004), available at hllp:llwww.cbo.go~!showd oc.crm ?index=4968&seque nce=:(l (find·
ing th ai reducing lorl liabilit y does nOI reduce medical spending); see also Frank A. Sloan &
John H. Shad le, Is There Empirical Evidence for "Defensive Medicine"? A Reassessment, 28 J .
HEAI..TH EcoN. 481, 481 (2009) (co ncluding Ihat "Ion reforms do not significa nlly arfect medical
decisions").
6 1. See Mic hael A. Morrisey, Meredilh L Kil gore & Leonard (Jac k) Ne lson, Medica! Malpractice Reform and Employer-Sponsored Heallh Insurance Premiums, 43 HEA \"TIl SERVICES
RES. 2124, 2124 (2008).
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buyers, and (2) no associatio n betwee n bealthcare cove rage and punitive and no neconomic damages caps.62 In sum, while damages caps
have been found in some cases to achieve their intended goals, albeit
having small impacts o n outcomes, much evidence supports the claim
that caps fail to stabilize medical malpractice insurance markets.
Due to the small number of cla ims closed post-cap, the Texas closed
claims data cannot be used to accurately estimate the impacts of tort
reform. D avid H yman and his co-authors, however, used it to estimate the hypotheticaL impact of the 2003 noneco nomic damages cap
on payouts related to claims closed from 1988 to 2004.63 H yman e t al.
first estimate the impact the cap would have had on jury verdicts.64
They the n use this an alysis to consid er how the cap might have affe cted settlements. 65 The results comport with prior findin gs:66 while
caps would have had a substantial impact on damages awards at trial ,
the impact on actual payouts would have been much smaller, although
substantial given the restrictive cap of $250,000. 67 Most importantly,
their findin gs provide clues as to why caps might not impact medical
malpractice insurance premiums in predicted ways. Using insights
from previous research that find s that payouts in Texas rarely exceed
the provider's insurance policy limits, H yman et al. note that damages
caps th at exceed average policy limits sho uld no t have a substantial
impact. 68 Thus, while Hyman and his colleagues' analysis certainly
cannot provide a complete ly accurate picture o f how the cap would
have impacted outcomes (because, for exa mple, some claims wo uld
not have been bro ught at all had caps bee n imposed) ,69 it does help
explain , at least in part , why caps might not impact payouts and premiums in predicted ways.
62. See Ronen A... raham & Max M. Schanze nbach. Impact of TOri Reform 011 Private Hea/rh
lllSurollce Coverage (Nw. Uni .... Sch. o f Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Series. Pape r No. 0716 , 2007). available a/ htl p:l/ssm.comlabstract=995270.
63. Hyman et aI., Evidellce from Texas. supra note 8, at 355.
64. Id. al 364-65.
65. Id. at 370-72.
66. See infra notes 83-87 and accompanying tex\.
67. Hyman et at , Evidence from Texas, supra note 8, at 405 (" We fi nd that th is cap will ha ... e
economically significant effects. For tried cases, holding case mix consta nt, the cap will reduce
allowed noneconomic da mages by an estimated 73%, allowed ... erdicts by 38% , and payouts by
27-pe rcent. In se tt led cases, the estimated decl ine in payo uts is 18%.").
68. See illfra notes 99- 1JO and accompanying text (disc ussing the impact of poliey limits on
payou ts).
69. In ad dition, the authors made a numbe r of ass umpti ons about how ca ps impact damages
awa rds beca use th ey lacked im portant information such as the portion of economic da mages
attri buted to medical expe nses, to whic h the dea th cap does not apply. See Hyma n et aI., Evidence from Texas, supra note 8, at 366.
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Empirical studies have not only demonstrated the general ineffectiveness of tort reform, but tbey have also exposed some potentially
harmful impacts that tort reforms can have on subsets of the injured
patient population. Using Texas closed claims data, Hyman et al. predict a disparate impact across plaintiff groups, with the deceased, unemployed, and (likely) elderly plaintiffs enduring much larger
reductions in recoveries than other plaintiffs. 70 Mello reports results
that demonstrate a similar effect for the most severely injured pJaintiffs.1 1 The literature addressing this question is thin, however; more
research is needed in order to better understand whether and how
caps impact outcomes across various subsets of claimants. It should
be noted, however, that relatively low recoveries are not the sale concern. Analysts must also consider the difficulty these types of patients
will have in finding lawyers who are willing to represent them pursuant to contingency fee arrangements. This impact is difficult to estimate, but it remains an important part of the big picture.
Recent sophisticated empirical studies that examine the impacts of
tort reform on the liability system and insurance markets make it difficult for proponents of tort reforms to claim that traditional reforms,
such as ·damages caps! will substantially quell rising insurance premiums without reducing the neediest claimants' ability to recover. Data
have certainly allowed more objective assessments of the trade-offs
we face in exchange for potential marginal benefits obtained from implementing the most effective tort reforms.
Ill.

DRAWING INFERENCES FROM LARGE VERDICT AWARDS

In addition to rhetoric on the connection between the liability system and insurance markets, tort refonn debates are also often influenced by unsubstantiated claims related to trends in medical
malpractice jury verdicts and how these verdicts impact eventual insurer payouts and premiums. Proponents of tort reform argue that
out-of-control juries hold healthcare providers liable for medical malpractice more often than they should 72 and that juries have been
awarding plaintiffs increasingly large amounts of damages, which
70. Set! id. at 381-82.
71. Set! Melio, supra note 55, at 13.
72. See, e.g., Peter Baker, Bush Campaigns to Curb LawsuilS, WA SH. POST,Jan. 6, 2005, at A6.
Bush surrounded himself with doctors in white coats to argue that "junk lawsuits" were
driving physicians out of places such as CoUinsviUc, ranked by advocates as the friendli ·
est place in tbe United States for trial lawyers chasing big awards. "You see firsthand
what happens when the system gets out of control," he told a crowd of supporters.
Id.
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forces insure rs to either substantially increase premiums o r ex it the
market. 73
A recent empirical study by David Studdert and ot hers provides
one o f the first assessments of tort reform propone nts' claims that
medical liability system error rates are excessively high.74 They find
that error rates are lower than tort reform proponents ofte n c1aim.15
In roughly 73 % o f claims in which physici ans concluded that medical
error caused the pl aintiffs injury , the plaintiff received compe nsation.
In addition, in roughly 72% of claims in which no medica l error was
found , plaintiffs received no compensation. 76 The authors also find
that payment size is positively correlated with whether a medica l error
occurred.77 These findings suggest that the liability system's e rror
rate, while substantial and cause for concern, is not as high as some
have c1aimed. 7s
Recent empirical findings also allow us to assess claims about trends
in Texas medical malpractice verdicts and how verdicts impact payouts
and premiums. Section A summ arizes recent findin gs, which suggest
that despite an increase in Texas medi cal malpractice jury awards,
payouts have remained stable over time .79 Section B descri bes evidence that might help explain this counterintuiti ve finding. The evidence suggests that insurance policy limits tend to limit payouts
regardl ess of verdict size. Patients ra rely recover more than the provider's policy limit, even when juries award large verdicts.so Fin ally.
Section C presents fi ndings that are consistent with the cl aim that
Texas physicians are strategical1y decreasing their insurance coverage,
73. Su, e.g., James Dao, A Push in Smles to Curb Malpractice Costs, N.Y. TIMl'S, Jan. 14, 2005,
al All ("{MJa ny insurance com panies had slopped iss uing policies, reducing compelilion and
causi ng premiums to rise."); She ryl Gay Stolberg, Senate Rejects Award Limits in Malpractice,
N.Y. TIMes, May 9, 2006, al A2S ("Mr. Frist and other supporters of revamping malpraclice law,
including the American Medical Association, have argued for years Ihat rising ins urance rates,
fueled by skyrocketing jury awa rds, Ire d ri ving doctors out of business and compromising patie nl cart. ~).
74. See David Studdert et al., Claims, Erron, and Comperuation Payments in Medical Malpractice Litigatian, 354 NEW ENO. J. MED. 2024, 2024 (2006).
15. Id.. al2031.
16. Id. 8t 2027-28.
17. Id. at 2024.
19. Id. at 2031 ("[ Pjortraits of a malpractice system that is stricken with frivolous litigation are
overbl ow n."). It is im portant to nOle th at physicians who reviewed the medical records associated with these cases had access to the litiga tion outcome, which mighl have inn uenced their
medical e rror determinations. See id. al 203 1-32 (cau tioning the reader about several li mita tions
of the stud y). Additional research is required to confi rm conclusions drawn from the st udy
about the liability system error rale.
79. See discussion infra Part III.A.
80. Su disc ussion infra Part III.B.
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which might further reduce payments that injured patients receive. 8 ]
While additional research is necessary to more fully understand the
relationship between the liability system and insurance markets, the
current evidence suggests that Texas might be experiencing a patient
compensation crisis, rather than a medical malpractice liability crisis.

A.

Verdicts v. Payouts

Tort reform proponents often point to large verdict awards as evidence of a broken medical malpractice liability system. They argue
that unjustified blockbuster awards encourage plaintiff attorneys, who

typically work on a contingency fee basis, to play the "lawsuit 101tery."82 In addition, they claim that awards impact not only claims
rates, but also settlement behavior of claimants and insurers. Fear of
out-of-control juries, the argument goes, compels insurers to settle
even non meritorious claims with large payments.
Using verdicts to predict settlement behavior, however, might lead
to substantial errors if payouts and verdicts tend to diverge. Payouts
can be lower than verdicts for several reasons: (1) adjustments made
through remittitur, (2) appellate court reversals, (3) imposition of statutory damages caps, and (4) post-verdict settlement negotiations.
Conversely, we expect payouts to exceed verdicts in some cases, such
as when plaintiffs accept payments in excbange for foregoing the appeal of pro-defendant verdicts. Therefore, data on verdicts might lead
to false impressions about the amount of money that changes hands.
Actual payments have been notoriously difficult to estimate, given the
lack of available data on settlements.
My co-authors and I used the Texas data on claims closed from 1988
to 2003 to estimate differences between verdicts and payouts. 83 We
find that payouts fall far short of verdicts in the vast majority of "large
claim" cases~cases with total payouts of at least $25,000 in 1988 dollars.84 While jury verdicts and payouts are positively correlated, 75%
of post-verdict payments were lower than the adjusted verdict, which
is defined as jury award plus pre- and post-judgment interest.85 An
analysis of 306 verdicts handed down in large claim cases closed from
81. Su discussion infra Part 1II.e.
82. See generally JEFFREY O'CONNEL.L, THE LAWSU IT loTTERY: ONLY THE LAWYERS WII'''
(1979).
83. See Hyman et aI., supra note 8, at 3. Of 13,269 incidents of alleged malpractice that reo
sulted in payouts of at leaSt $25,000 (in 1988 dollars) , 690 (5.1%) went to trial and 315 (2.7%)
resulted in a verdict. Jd. at 16 tbl.2. Fifteen cases that involved bench trials were excluded from
the analysis. Itl.
84. Id. at 4.
85. /d. at 5. Five percent of payouts following verdicts exceeded adjusted verdicts. Id. at 6.
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1988 to 2003 revealed that plaintiffs received only 56% of total adjusted verdicts ($212 million total payouts following adjusted verdicts
totaling $482 million),86 The mean per-case "haircut " was 29% of the
adjusted verdict, and the median was 19%.87
In addition, the study finds that haircuts and adjusted verdicts are
positively correlated. Forty-seven percent of plaintiffs who were
awarded adjusted verdicts of less than $100,000 experienced an average haircut of 8% per case,sa In contrast, ninety-eight percent of
plaintiffs who were awarded adjusted verdicts in excess of $2.5 million
experienced an average haircut of 56%,89 As the adjusted verdict increases, both the percentage of cases taking a haircut and the average
per-case haircut increase. 90 These findings underscore the difficulties
inherent in justifying tort refo rm by pointing to verdicts, often widely
reported by the press, and ignoring eventual payouts, which the press
almost never reports.
While accounting for the differences between verdicts and payo uts
is important, understanding why these differences occur will better
our understanding of the tort system's inner workings. The following
Section summarizes findings that illuminate the various factors that
drive the verdict-payout discrepancy.

B.

Explaining the Discrepancy

Remittitur, appellate court reversals, imposition of damages caps,
and post-verdict settle ment negotiations account for a portion of the
$270 million that Texas plaintiffs were awarded from 1988 to 2003 but
never received. 91 The data TOl collects allow us to estimate the impact of various mechanisms that aim to limit post-verd ict payments.
Judicial oversight in the form of re mittitur, judgme nt notwithstanding the verdict (JNOY), and appellate reversals had a small direct im pact on haircuts. 92 Judges reduced verdicts through remittitur in
roughly 5% of cases, for a total reduction of approximately $9 million
(3.3% of the total haircut).93 JNOY and appellate reversals also ac86. {d. al 25.
87 . Id. See id. al 14, for delaib o n ho w pre· and post-judgment inlerest were compu ted.

{d. al 6.
fd.
fd. at 32 tbl.lO.
Id. at 4-6.
92. Id. at 6. It should be noted tha t judicial oversight might indirectly impact post·verdict
settlemen t negotiations. This indireci impact is impossi ble to measure; th erefore, we like ly un·
derestimate tb e innuence of judicial oversight on haircuts.
93. Id. at 35. If reversed remittiturs are excl uded, the total reduction is approximately SS.S
million (2% of the total haircut). Id.
88.
89.
90.
91.
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count for a small portion of the total haircut in large payout c1aimsroughly $2.5 million of the $270 million total haircut (about 1 % of the
total haircut).94
During the period we studied, legislators required Texas courts to
impose statutory caps on punitive damages and damages awarded in
death cases. 9S The punitive damages cap reduced damages awards in
5 of the 22 cases in which punitive damages were awarded. 96 The total
reduction was roughly $44 million, which amounts to 62% of the
awarded punitive damages and 16% of the total haircut. A cap on
recovery in wrongful death cases applied in 66 cases. 97 The cap does
not apply to medical expenses, and TDI does not report these expenses separately; thus, the impact of this cap is a rough estimate.9s
At most, however, we estimated that the wrongful death cap accounted for roughly $38 million of the $270 million total haircut
(roughly 14% of the total haircut). Therefore , together, statutory caps
accounted for approximately 30% of the total haircut. This estimate,
plus the estimated impact of judicial oversight, leaves roughly twothirds of the total haircut to be explained.
It turns out that the largest portion of the total haircut is due to the
fact that plaintiffs rarely collect more than the provider's insurance
policy limit , even when the adjusted verdict greatly exceeds the policy
limit.99 Figure 1 displays payout-to-policy-limit ratios for single-payer
cases in which the policy limit was at least as large as the adjusted
verdict and cases in which the adjusted verdict exceeded the policy
limit ("above-limits cases").IOO For cases in which the payout-to-policy-limit ratio was 100% , the payout was exactly equal to the policy
limit. As Figure 1 reflects, 31 % (24 out of 77) of above-limits singlepayer cases had payouts between 95% and 105% of policy limits. A
majority (53%) of above-limits cases settled at or below policy limits,
with the limits effectively capping recovery.101 Depending on the as94. /d. at 36.

95. See id. al 12-13, for a de5Cription of the caps.
96. Id. at 36-37.
97. Id. at 38.
98. Id. Wc assumed that none of the economic damages were for medical expenses; therefore,
we overestimated the impact of th e wrongful death cap.
99. Id. at 39-47.
100. We included o nly single-payer cases in this analysis because we do not have full information about excess coverage in multi·payer cases. Of the 315 cases that went to verdict, 214 were
single-payer cases with sufficient infonnation on policy limits to analyze the impact of limits on
payouis. Id. at 39. Caution should be used when drawing inferences from single·payer cases,
howeve r. For example, payouts related to single-payer cases are smaller than those for multipayer cases. Id. at 15.
101. fd. at 41.
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sumptions adopted to estim ate the impact of policy limits on recoveries, policy limits accoun t for 73% to 87% of total haircuts in singlepayer cases. 102 For this subset of cases, judicial oversight and caps
explain only 1.5% to 15% of the total hai rcu t, d epending on estimation assumptions. I OJ
FIGU R E

THE I MPACT OF LIMITS ON P A YOUTS 104
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In a sepa rate study, we analyzed the impact of policy limits o n
payouts in all claims against physicians with payouts of at least $25,000
in 1988 dollars, including those th at senie prior to vcrdict. lOs We find
that policy limits act as de facto caps in these cases as wel1; only 1.5 %
of large payout claims had above-limit pay mentsY)6 Interestingly, prima ry carriers funded most of th ese payments. lin Physicians made outo f-pocket payments in only 62% of the 9,525 cases that cl osed from
102. leL at 46. O ne estimate assu mes that caps and rcmilli turs arc applied first and then policy
lim its bind the paymen t. The ot her assumes policy limits bind the payment before caps and
rcmillitu rs have an impact.
103. Id.
104. leL at 42 fig.6.
lOS. Zeiler et al.. supra note 8. at S9.
106. Id. at 511.
107. !d. While we did not cxplore the reasons why insurers pay IImou nts above the lim its. we
conjccture that insu rers make payments in some CliseS to avoid bad faith se ttlement cla ims by
providcrs who wish to sellie when tbe insurer wishes to defend the provider against the claim.
Id. at 53!.
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1990 to 2003. 108 In addition, although we might expect more out-ofpocket payments in cases in which policy limits are low, we find that
low policy limits did not trigger a flood of out-DC-pocket payments by
physicians. 109 Physicians with $250,000 per occurrence policies made
an out-oF-pocket payment in only 32 of 2,488 claims (1.3%).110
While additional unobservable factors, such as high-low agreements, likely explain a portion of the total haircut, post-j udgment settlements clearly play a substantial role in reducing payments to
plaintiffs, even when the plaintiffs win large verdicts. This alone is
cause for concern, given the primary goals of the tort system: to compensate negligently injured patients for their losses and to deter negligence. Concern might extend beyond this, however, if we consider
how physicians might react as they learn that they face limited personal exposure even when injured patients might perceive them as being underinsured.
Although we do not fully understand why policy limits act as de
facto caps on recoveries, II I the Texas closed claim data provide some
insights into coverage trends. 112 The following Section discusses the
findings associated with policies purchased by Texas physicians who
were involved in large paid claims.

C

Trends in Medical Malpractice Coverage and
Implications for Tort Recoveries

The conventional wisdom seems to be that physicians hold medical
malpractice insurance policies with $1 million per-occurrence limits.1I 3
The Texas closed claims data suggest otherwise, at least for policies
that covered large paid claims closed from 1990 to 2003. The median
policy limit for the ' subset of policies covering these claims was
$500,000 in nominal dollars.1l4 Only 31 % of policies in the sample
108. 'd. al 526.
109. fd. al 527.
110. fd.
1I1. 'd. al 539.
112. 'd. al S32-S34.
113. See, e.g. , Frederick W. Cheney, How Much Professionul Liabilily Coverage Is Enough?
Lessons from Ihe ASA Closed Claims PrOjeCl, AM. 5oc'y ANESnfESIOLOGISTIi NEWSLETTER.
lune 1999, hllp:llwww.asahq.org/Newslcllers/I999I06_99fHow0699.hlml (examining Ihe "convenlional wisdom" Ihal physicians purchase insura nce wilh $1 million per-occurrence limilS and
$3 million 10lal annua l limi ts); AMERICAN COLl_EOE OF EMEROENCY PHYSICIANS, MEDICAl..
PROFESSIONAl.. LIABII..ITY INSURANCE 7 (2004), hltp:llwww.acep.orgfNRlrdonlyres/DD94E243339F-4A02-983D-7S63D42BCE7410/ MPLIpaperApril04.pdf (claiming lhal "[mlosl policies provide $1 million for each incide nl wilh a maximum of $3 million pcr policy period").
114. Zeiler et al., supra note 8, at 532.
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had limits of $1 million. lIS Six percent had limits of more than $1
millio n, and 32% had limits of $200,000 or less. 116
Insurers in Texas are required to report the year in which a physician purchased the policy that covered the paid claim.117 These d ata
allow us to estimate time trends in physician purchasing habits fo r policies covering large paid claims. Sample sizes for purchase years
1988-1999 were suffici ent to estimate average limits. Figure 2 displays
time trends in policy size by purchase year for perinatal and non perina tal physicians. 118 Real mean and medium limits on policies purchased by both perinatal and nonperinatal physicians who were late r
involved in large paid claims fell by roughly 30% from 1988 to 1999. 11 9
FIGURE

2:
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Although our study did not investigate what might be driving the
decline in real coverage, we offer a few conjectures_ 12l One theory,
115, !d.
116. Id.
117. See supra note 9_
1 [8. While TDI does not re quire insurers to report the specialty o f th e physician agai nst
whom a claim is made, it does requi re reporl ing of the pa tient's age. We c ha racte rize a ll claims
for injury to pa lie nts aged one month or younger at the lime of the injury as per inata l claims.
This allows us to estimate trends fo r a group of physicia ns tho ugh t to be hardest hit by the o ut of·contro l liabi lity system. See Ze ile r e l aI., supra no te 8, at 518.
119. fd. a t S33- S34. Declines over lime were statistically significant a t the I % Signi ficance
leve l. fd.
120. fd. at 534 fig.9. Policies relate to s ingle -payer cases resolved with a payment of at least
$25,000 in 1988 dollars.
121. fd. a l 538·39.
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consistent with observed trends, suggests (hat physicians purchase
smaller and cheaper po lici es after realizing that exposure is minute

even when coverage is IOW.122 While most man aged ca re organizations and hospitals require their physicians to hold liability insurance,
physicians are likely able to influence decisio ns over required coverage levels. Whether declining coverage is explained by something as
simple as an increase in premiums or relatively cheap alternativese.g., asset protection strategies-or by a more complex story of strategic behavior o n the part of providers, declining coverage reduces payments under the li ability system. This, in turn, might limit the ability
of the system to deliver just outcomes for injured patients.

IV.

CONCLUSION

These findings, together with o ther published findings, help us evaluate whether and how well the -medical malpractice liability system
meets its primary goals: just compensa tion and deterrence. Contrary
to the common rheto ric heard during tort re form debates, evidence
suggests tha t the connection between the liability syste m and insurance markets is tenuous, which makes it unsurprising that tort reform
has little to no impact on insurance markets. In addition , Texas closed
claims d ata suggest th at large jury awards, which get ample press, are
often fo llowed by much smaller payouts, a fact almost never accompanying news of jumbo verdicts. A large portio n of the differe nce is
attributable to the find ing th at patients rarely receive more than the
provider's policy limits. This, coupled with the fa ct that Texas physici ans are purchasing less rea l coverage o ver time, suggests that we
might be facing a patient compensa tion crisis rather than a medical
malpractice liability crisis.
While the data collected by the TD! have proven extre mely useful
for esta blishing a se t of facts from which debates about how best to
handle crises can begin , data o n closed medical malpractice claims are
rare. Either the data are not collected or they are collected but not
made publicly avail able.123 Acade mic researchers have a substanti al
122. Id.
123. Flo rida a nd Missouri coll ect sim ila r da tasets a nd make the m publ icly a vai lable. Michiga n
collects closed clai ms data , but they a re avail able o nly in pape r fo rm. Illinois, New Yo rk , Minnesota, Massachusetts, Ne vada, an d Washin gton co llect closed claims da ta but do no t all ow th e
publi c access to them. Most s ta tes do not collect s uch data. The Nat ional Pract itio ne r Da ta
Bank (N PDB) also collects a nd allows public access to da ta o n paid med ical malpract ice claims.
al though the da ta arc not a ud it ed for com pl e tenes.~ a nd accu racy. See La wre nce E. Smarr, A
Compararive Ass~smelll of the PIA A Data Sharing Project and the Notional Practitioner Dara
Bank: Policy, Purpase, and A pplication , 60 LAw & CONTE MP. PRoas. 59, 59 ( 1997); Jose ph T.
Hallin an, Allemplto Track Malpractice Cas~ Is Often Thwarted, WAL L Sr. J., Aug. 27, 2004, a t I.
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role to play in helping to increase the volume of available data, to
establish fa ctual baselines, and to study important yet unresolved
questions. Involvement comes in many forms, including generating
datasets from legal rules,124 gathering data from market players,l25
and collaborating with organizations that work to increase the volume
of available data that can be used to fashion more efficacious policy.
To this end , I and others have been working with th e National Association of Insurance Commissioners to draft a model law that requires state departments of insurance to coUect medical malpractice
closed claims data from insurance companies and self·insured market
actors,1 26 The hope is that a substantial number of states will adopt
the model law and that uniform mulli-state data will be available to
the public. Multi-state data would allow for a more sophisticated
analysis of the ca uses of medical malpractice insurance crises (assuming they exist) , the causes of medical error, and the impacts of tort
reform on premiums, payments, and claims rates, just to name a few.
Involvement by academics can mitigate, at least to some extent, the
influence of industry actors who have strong incentives to keep the
data private.
It should be noted that we do not know much about the generalizability of the results reported in the Texas studies. This is cause for
concern as the stat e may differ in important ways from other states
that experience severe fluctuations in medical malpractice insurance
premiums. 127 In addition, all empirical studies are inherently limited
due to missing observations, limited time periods, and other data im perfections. Studies produced using the Texas data , however, demonDespite the~e shortcomings, $Orne have used the NPDB data to analyze medical malpraetice
liability trends. See, e.g.• Avraham, supra nole 48, at S183.
124. See, e.g., Avraham, supra note 24, at 116-18 (constructing dataset of tori reforms passed
by state and by year, including results of judicial dete rm inations of constitutional challenges to
reforms).
125. See, e.g., Tom Baker, Blood Money, Ne.", Money, and the Morlll Economy o/To" LA.", in
A ction, 35 LAw &. Soc. Rev. 275 (2001) (employing qualitati ve data gat hered from interviews o f
practicing medical malpractice attorneys to siudy why ph ysicians lend not to payout o f their
own pockets on claims with payments in excess of the policy limits); Albert Yoon, Dllmage Caps
lind Civil LitiglltiQn: An Empirical Study 0/ Medical Malpractice Litigation in the South , 3 AM.
LAw &. Ecol'<. Rev. 199,202 (2001) (using data obtained from a medical malpractice insurer to
study the impacts of damage caps on payment severity).
126. A draft of th e model law, guidelines for companion regulations, and opinion leiters from
interested parties-including physician groups, insurance companies, and academics-are availa·
ble at http;lfwww.naic.orgfdocumentslcommilleeS_c_sitC080221_Med_MaCSITF_Requesc
closed-claifTLrepo rtin&J11ode l_law.pdf.
127. For example, Texas has one of the nation's largest homestead exemptions, which might
make it relatively easy for doctors to protect at least some of their assets from aetachment. Su
TEX. COI'IST. arl. XVI, If 50, 51 (p!"otecting homes from forced sale for the payment of most
debts).
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strate tbe value of observation in understanding whether the liability
system e nhances or limits civil justice for injured patients. Policy makers are more likely to implement effective solu ti ons if debates stand
on fi rm foundations th at are established by facts rather than rhetoric.
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